State Iran Testimony. From undersecretary of state for political affairs William J. Burns' prepared testimony on Iran to the Senate Foreigh Relations committee tomorrow:
Behavior change, multilateral framework, tough-minded diplomacy, emphasis on some gains, unified international community, benefits to Iran and Iranians of accepting P5+1 offer. Posted by Laura at July 8, 2008 09:19 PM... The purpose of our policy is to change Iran’s problematic policies and behavior by making common cause with as much of the international community as we can. Our goal is to convince Iran to abandon any nuclear weapons ambitions, cease its support for terrorist and militant groups, and become a constructive partner in the region. As President Bush has said, “all options are on the table, but the first option for the United States is to solve this problem diplomatically.” This requires tough minded diplomacy, maximizing pressure on the Iranians at multiple points to drive home the costs of continued defiance of the rest of the world, especially on the nuclear issue. At the same time, however, we are trying to make clear to Iran and its people what they stand to gain if they change course. As Secretary Rice said at Davos earlier this year, “America has no permanent enemies, we harbor no permanent hatreds. Diplomacy, if properly practiced, is not just talking for the sake of talking. It requires incentives and disincentives to make the choice clear to those with whom you are dealing that you will change your behavior if they are willing to change theirs. Diplomacy can make possible a world in which enemies can become, if not friends, then no longer adversaries.”
This Committee is intimately familiar with the dual-track strategy that we have employed in concert with our P5+1 partners – the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China – to put before the Iranian leadership a clear choice, so that it chooses a better way forward. Javier Solana’s June 14 visit to Tehran to present the updated incentives package was an essential element of this approach, stressing the significant political, economic, technological, and energy benefits that could accrue to Iran if its leaders chose cooperation over their current course.
President Bush emphasized last month at the US-EU Summit that we seek to address this issue through a multilateral framework. He said: “Unilateral sanctions don’t work…One country can’t solve all problems…A group of countries can send a clear message to the Iranians, and that is: ‘We are going to continue to isolate you. We’ll continue to work on sanctions. We’ll find new sanctions if need be if you continue to deny the just demands of a free world.’”
Consistent with the President’s vision, Iran’s failure to restore the international community’s confidence in its intentions has not gone without consequences. The UN Security Council has adopted four resolutions on Iran, including three imposing Chapter VII sanctions. While some have questioned the impact of these measures, we do see a tangible effect. Two and half weeks ago, the European Union adopted sanctions on 38 additional Iranian individuals and entities, including prohibiting business with, and imposing an asset freeze on, Iran’s largest bank, Bank Melli. ...
The international community is more unified than in the past on the necessity for Iran to fully and verifiably suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and reestablish international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. [...]
In summary - -
We have presented the Iranian government with a historic opportunity to do two things: to restore the confidence of the international community in its nuclear intentions, and to give its own people the access to technology, nuclear energy, education, and foreign investment that would truly open the way to economic prosperity.
We have made clear that we do not object to Iran playing an important role in the region, commensurate with its legitimate interests and capabilities, but also that Iran is far more likely to achieve its desired level of influence if it works with the international community and its neighbors, rather than if it works against them. We recognize that it would be useful for Iran to be “at the table” on major international matters if Tehran is willing to contribute in a constructive fashion.
The dual-track strategy to which we often refer in connection with the nuclear file, in fact, applies more broadly. Engaging in a diplomatic process on the broad range of issues at stake between our two states and working toward the restoration of Iran’s relationship with the international community would offer clear benefits for Iran and the Iranian people. But equally so, any continuation on its present course will entail high and increasing costs for Iran. Putting that choice to the Iranian leadership as clearly and acutely as possible is the core of our policy.
What we seek, let me emphasize, is a change in Iran’s behavior--a change in how it assesses and interacts within its own strategic environment. We should not let the Iranian leadership entrench itself on the false pretext that it is under threat from the outside. We have committed repeatedly and at the highest levels to deal diplomatically with the Iranian regime. The fact that this diplomatic dialogue has been limited to less than satisfying talks in Baghdad is the unfortunate choice of the Iranian leadership. As the recent presentation of yet another P5+1 offer makes clear, we do not exclude engagement. We remain ready to talk to Tehran about its nuclear program and the array of other American concerns about Iranian policies, as well as to address any issues Iran chooses to raise in a diplomatic context.
The Iranians are not completely closed off, and neither should the United States be. Careful consideration suggests that in certain contexts, we should have overlapping interests with Iran – for example, in a stable, unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors, in a stable Afghanistan, and in stemming narcotics trafficking. Broadly speaking, a responsible Iran can and should play an important, positive role in the region. This is possible, if Iran is willing to work constructively with the international community and its neighbors.
We recognize that we have not yet achieved our desired goals: Iran has still not agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and other proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. Iran has not ceased unconventional warfare and some of its policies continue to contribute to regional instability. Iran’s current leadership may be so dogmatic or paralyzed by internal disagreements that it cannot agree in the near-term to terms so obviously to its advantage. With our long-term goal of persuading Iran to change its current course in mind, our immediate actions are intended to clarify the price of defiance by forcing Tehran to find new finance and trade partners and replace funding streams it has lost. We have made several notable successes, and will continue to work toward the objective of triggering a strategic recalculation in Iran’s thinking. ....