Gary Sick, former Iran hand in the Ford, Carter, Reagan White Houses, reads the Iranian tea leaves:

... This offer by Iran does not come out of the blue. Despite the US instinctive reaction that Iran rejected the Solana offer, it was quite clear from the start that Iran was giving it serious consideration.

What is different about this package from the ones that preceded it? It is difficult to say anything authoritative, since we haven't actually seen (or heard) what Solana delivered, and Iran's responses have been positive but ambiguous. Still, one thing that seems to have changed is what appears to me to be a fairly clear signal from the 5+1 negotiators that they are willing to contemplate the reality that Iran has acquired centrifuge technology, that there is probably little that can be done to reverse that entirely, and so the objective has perhaps subtly changed to consideration of how to stop the process before it gets worse and to contain it, if possible.

That may be reading more into the discourse than it deserves, but then I would never expect the 5+1 to simply announce that they have changed their objectives and tactics. So a little guess work is justified. But if it is true (even if that fact is left entirely to emerge during actual negotiations) it means that these talks might have a chance of success.

Has Iran been spooked into this by recent frantic signaling and demonstrations (the Syrian hit; Israeli bombing exercises in the E. Med; or even, as someone suggested today, reaction to Sy Hersh's latest broadside)? Possibly, but I'm dubious. Those with even fairly short memories will recall times when the US had three carriers in the Gulf and Cheney and Hersh were making direct threats/predictions and prompting even higher levels of pundit hysteria than today, and the Iranians seemed totally unmoved.

Is it because the Bush administration is in its waning days and so is a more palpable threat to do something rash? Actually, this familiar argument can be turned on its head. The time has probably already passed when the Bush administration can launch another war (against the will of the American people, the Pentagon, the Congress, the UNSC and all US friends and allies without exception -- not to mention simple good sense). But Bush seems to be moving into a late pragmatic phase, perhaps in the search for a legacy, that makes constructive negotiations more likely. (If you don't believe me, just look at what
apoplectic John Bolton is saying.)

The "surge" in Iraq, although portrayed as super-hawkish, was in fact a total reversal of the faith-based, ideology-driven tactics of the previous four years to something more like a pragmatic effort to coopt (or "rent") the enemy and do some robust nation-building at the local, tribal and urban level. It has worked better than most ever expected, and it may become a lonely feather in Bush's otherwise disastrous Iraq cap.

The deal with North Korea is the other achievement of this waning presidency, and it is full of lessons for a potential deal with Iran. The Bush administration was willing to reverse course from a principled but self-defeating ideological position built on threats, to adopt a practical strategy of give and take, all the while pretending that we weren't negotiating directly with the crazy and unreliable folks in Pyongyang.

All we are missing on Iran is a Christopher Hill (or as Bolton calls him "Kim Jung-Hill"). Nick Burns didn't seem to be well equipped for that job, and he is now spending more time with his family. Is there someone else lurking in the wings? Who conducted the quiet negotiations with the Europeans that produced the Solana proposal?

Does Iran really want a deal? I think so. The sanctions are a constant drag on the oil industry and the economy. There is a strong current in Iranian leadership circles that wants to have a more constructive (and profitable) commercial and political relationship with the rest of the world, and the nuclear shouting match interferes at every level. There is an even stronger desire in Iran to be respected as a serious player and not always be regarded as a fanatic, unreliable pariah state.

Now that they have made their point about being able to construct and operate a nuclear infrastructure, they may feel it is time to stop standing on principle while shooting themselves in the foot, to coin a metaphor. A deal with the 5+1 negotiators would indeed mean that they could not build a nuclear weapon, but there is substantial evidence that that was not their intent. Simply showing they COULD do it (and that they could return to the game rather quickly), may have been enough for their purposes. It is certainly consistent with all of
their statements.

This suggests a major push-back against the policies of Ahmadinejad, who had been making a play for far more power than any other president in the history of the Islamic Republic. [Former Iranian foreign minister] Velayati's admonition that Iran must avoid "provocative" nuclear talk seems aimed directly at the president and his predilection for extravagant rhetoric. Whatever the truth, Ahmadinejad has been uncharacteristically silent so far. And the foreign minister, in NY, went out of his way to declare that the Holocaust was a historical reality. Hmmm. . .

None of this adds up to any resolution of the problem very soon. But an optimistic reading would regard this at least as the end of the beginning.