Fantasy Island. A knowledgeable Iraq observer offers this analysis to post, upon the occasion of the Petraeus and Crocker testimony today, which asks this question: If U.S. forces are defeating everybody, why are deaths still so high?

Among proponents of the surge, there is a lot of "fantasy Island" stuff coming out regarding the Sunni “awakening” and its relationship to the surge. Recognizing the precise contours of the fantasy requires us to take a closer look at the causal dynamics of the awakening, including the motivation of Sunni actors, the timing of their behavioral changes, and the importance of the surge.

MOTIVATION

Surge cheerleaders admit that the major motivation driving the Sunni sheiks and the "former" insurgents to forge cooperative relationships with U.S. forces is enemy-of-my-enemy logic, but they typically ignore the implications this has for evaluating the surge. Nearly everyone agrees that the sheiks and insurgents are responding to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) missteps (such as seizing wives from tribal families), atrocities against Sunnis, and economic and power grabs (especially since AQI declared the creation of the "Islamic State in Iraq" in Sunni areas last year) (see: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/). Sunni groups are cooperating with us to defeat their proximate enemy (AQI) while preparing to defend themselves against the Shia and the Iranians after our inevitable departure. In other words, the surge is irrelevant to the motivation behind the awakening.

TIMING

Both the Anbar Salvation Council (tribes against AQI) and the Reform and Jihad Front (insurgents against AQI) were created before the surge and, as I noted above, were motivated by non-surge-related considerations. It is true that the tempo of cooperation has picked up since January, but equating this correlation with the surge does not mean causation (as we shall see in a moment).

CAUSAL IMPORTANCE OF EXTRA TROOPS (THE SURGE)

One hypothesis advanced by surge advocates is that extra U.S. troops solidified tribal cooperation in Anbar because American forces could protect the sheiks against AQI reprisals. This is true, but is this dynamic surge related? The first instance of this protection arrangemet was when Colonel Sean McFarland made the decision to do this in Ramadi – in the summer of 2006. In general, the key has been the decision on the part of Army and Marine commanders to follow through on tribal engagement and protection (that is, a change in tactics and strategy) not extra troops per se. Plus, does the pro-surge crowd really think that, in Anbar, a gradual increase in 4,000 troops (on top of the 20-30k that were already there) was decisive in being able to protect the sheiks? There is no evidence for that. The better evidence is that U.S. troops helped facilitate, encourage, train and equip tribal militias (uh, I mean, "auxiliary police" and "provincial security forces") that could provide protection against AQI. Were the 4,000 extra troops in Anbar key to this? Again, there is no evidence or reason that they were. The key was a change in American actions that capitalized on intra-Sunni dynamics not more troops per se.

What about the former insurgents that are now cooperating with U.S. forces in Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, etc.? Did they need American protection to flip? I doubt it. Let's keep in mind, AQI is a vicious terrorist organization, but they are maybe 5% of the insurgency and are responsible for 10-15% of insurgent attacks (see: http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html). So, for surgenistas to be right that the "former" insurgents that are now cooperating to go after AQI needed our protection, we would have to conclude that the other 95% of the insurgency (you know, the guys who have bogged down the most powerful army in the history of the world for four years) need the U.S. to protect them against the small minority of fanatics and foreigners that make up AQI. Does that seem likely? No. They are using U.S. forces and capitalizing on the fact that they are helping militants go after their enemies -- and the fact that Americans are not targeting them in the interim. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence that much of the "cooperation" is not cooperation at all -- the former insurgents simply ask U.S. forces to get out of the way so they can clean out their areas of AQI.

A second pro-surge hypothesis is that the extra troops allowed a much higher tempo of operations to drive AQI out of safe havens throughout Iraq (Anbar, the Baghdad belts, north Babil, Diyala) and prevent them from setting up shop elsewhere. I think there is a lot of merit to this, but even here we need to be more careful about overplaying the importance of the surged troop levels as opposed to other factors. First, keep in mind that AQI is small. The key to defeating them is intelligence. U.S. forces get this intelligence from their relationships with Sunni tribes and "former" insurgents so they can more efficiently target AQI. If, as I argue, these relationships are not caused by the surge, then neither is the actionable intelligence. The extra troops certainly allow American troops to exploit this intelligence in more places simultaneously by protecting informants and conducting raids, which is speeding up the degradation of AQI, but by how much is unclear. In other words, with 130,000 troops (pre-surge), Iraqi Army help, and assistance from tribal militia and former insurgents, could U.S. forces have still accomplished much the same thing? Maybe. The surge helped, but the marginal benefits are hard to judge. Again, the key was the change in tactics and strategy facilitated by American cooperation with Sunnis, not higher troop numbers in-and-of-themselves. Second, we should not exaggerate U.S. gains. In many cases, AQI left towns before U.S. forces showed up (exhibit A is Baquba--the "Fallujah of 2007" and an AQI stronghold--where U.S. troops did not get the fight they expected). Is AQI gone for good? We'll see, but I'm not as optimistic as surge advocates are here.

DEFEATING THE SUNNI INSURGENCY?

Some surge fans come close to asserting that the Sunni insurgency is in its “last throes,” but there is little evidence that the U.S. has defeated the insurgency. Some of the insurgents are cooperating with coalition forces, but this is likely to be temporary since they are ultimately highly motivated to have American troops leave and are not highly motivated to reach an accommodation with the Shia government (and their perceived Persian patrons). Once U.S. forces are not useful, former insurgents will demand they depart or start attacking them again—that is, unless the Bush administration successfully exploits the current moment to lock in a new arrangement (see below).

Moreover, some insurgents are clearly still fighting, even in Anbar, and not all of these are AQI. (Which speaks to another issue in the worldview fleshed out by surge proponents: if AQI and the insurgents are basically done for, and we are making huge strides against sectarian violence too, who is doing all the killing? The total number of civilian deaths is down, but not significantly and only in comparison to their heights in mid-2006. There are still a significant number of Iraqis dying: (see http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/baghdad-surge/). If U.S. forces are defeating everybody, why are deaths still so high?)

MAINTAINING MOMENTUM: STAY THE COURSE?

The surge has mattered to the momentum on the ground, but its causal importance has been exaggerated by surge groupies. Furthermore, this momentum is fragile, but not for the reasons surge advocates think. It is fragile because there is a split between the Sunni sheiks and the former insurgents now helping us. All are purely self-interested parties, but the former is more pro-U.S. and dependent upon the American military. The latter represent the most virulently anti-occupation forces in Iraq. Their marriage of convenience with American forces is temporary and will not be furthered by staying at surged levels. Instead, if the U.S. doesn’t start to negotiate its departure, this relationship will likely end and end bloody.

Instead, as this excellent commentary from Marc Lynch (http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/09/ams-open-letter.html) suggests, the U.S. should exploit its temporary position of strength from the surge and use it to negotiate an American withdrawal to take advantage of the motivations and dynamics within the Sunni community. The goal would be to trade drawdowns from some areas (principally Sunni areas) in exchange for certain concessions from Sunni groups that would make them less threatening to the Shia/central government. At the same time, these negotiations would aim to include Shia groups (especially the Sadrists) that oppose the occupation, seeking to trade timetables, etc. for concessions from them that would make Sunnis more secure.

As Iraq moves toward a highly decentralized state, these negotiations could use the large U.S. troop presence as a means to stitch together a grand bargain with the warring parties (Dayton style) that would establish a framework and a rough balance of power that might be sustainable after U.S. forces leave. However, this will only be viable in the context of a professional and non- sectarian Iraqi Army to police the seams. Fortunately, as the General Jones report suggested, the capabilities of the Iraqi Army are such that the U.S. may be able to draw down gradually over the next 12-18 months, moving to a support and “overwatch” role, and not lose the gains from the past year.

In short, if the administration, working with Democrats in Congress, crafts a careful and responsible new strategy, it may be able to seize on the modest momentum of the present to move the United States forward and out of Iraq -- but that strategy would not embrace an open-ended commitment to the surge.