The Salvador Option, revisited. A possible model for the "hunker down and tilt" hybrid option, a reader suggests: El Salvador. (See, for example, this).

In some corners of the USG, "the 'Salvador option' has been viewed as a great model -- big effect with only a few advisors. This is especially the case in the special ops community which has long argued that we should've gone this route a long time ago. It also plays well with those who argue that our big presence breeds dependence."

From Jonathan Tepperman's April 2005 Foreign Affairs article, "Salvadaor in Iraq":

....During El Salvador's bloody twelve-year civil war, which ended in 1992, the United States had used American trainers and vast amounts of cash to strengthen the Salvadoran military in its battle against leftist guerrillas. It had also allegedly supported the use of right-wing paramilitaries and death squads to liquidate the leaders of the rebellion. And it was this latter policy, the articles claimed, that was now being contemplated for Iraq: the creation of elite commando units, trained by American Special Operations Forces, and made up of Shia militiamen and Kurdish peshmerga, to hunt down leaders of the Sunni insurgency. When asked, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stopped short of categorically denying the Salvador option, but refused to comment further.

Although Rumsfeld isn't talking, others close to him have, and their comments suggest that the Salvador option may be on the table— an ominous sign for Iraq. In resurrecting El Salvador— one of the darkest episodes in recent U.S. history— as a model of a successful counterinsurgency, the Pentagon and hawks close to the administration have relied on faulty history and wishful thinking. Contrary to conservative conventional wisdom, U.S. policy in Central America during the '80s was seriously misguided, and— other than contributing to the death of tens of thousands of civilians— ultimately ineffectual. If applied in Iraq today, the results could be even worse.

Despite Rumsfeld's tepid denials, enthusiasm for using El Salvador as a precedent for Iraq runs deep in Republican foreign policy circles. Prominent hawks close to the administration have publicly touted the benefits of this approach. Max Boot, of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that U.S. policy in Central America was "tremendously successful" at putting down local insurgencies and that "everyone agrees" it is the model to follow. And Eliot Cohen, director of the Strategic Studies Program at Johns Hopkins— and whose last book was reported to be bedtime reading for President Bush— has said, "We did counterinsurgency very well in Salvador."

When Newsweek first reported this line of thinking, back in early 2005, obviously the death squads part of the thesis is what caught everybody's attention. (And thinking back, if I'm remembering correctly, that was still when the existence of Shiite death squads wasn't entirely established -- clearly, there's no doubt any longer). But given the current debate, we shouldn't overlook as well the 'few US advisors having large impact' part, and the current consensus gathering around the idea of ramping up the number of US advisors and trainers sent to Iraq as a possible direct US combat role decrease is contemplated.

Update: More on the counterinsurgency lessons of Salvador being contemplated for Iraq from a 2005 piece by Jason Vest.

Posted by Laura at December 1, 2006 01:16 PM