The real nuclear option. As international leaders gather today in New York for the first time in five years to review the thirty-five year old Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). it is becoming alarmingly more apparent by the day that the Bush administration's policies towards nuclear-aspiring Iran and North Korea are incoherent and failing, in no small part because the administration is internally divided and loathe to be seen to be "managing" problems with rogue states but doesn't seem to have any better solutions. What's the result, then, today? Keep doing the same thing, only louder, Derek Chollet argues:

One would think that given all this – and given the obvious flaws in the NPT that allow states to acquire the technologies needed to produce nuclear weapons capabilities legally– the United States would be heading into this important meeting with an ambitious, bold agenda to reform and strengthen the NPT for the 21st century.

Nope.

Instead, it appears that the Administration wants to use the conference to defend its failing policies toward North Korea and Iran...

It’s bad enough that the Bush team lacks either the will or the way to deal with specific WMD threats like North Korea -- its broader approach to non-proliferation is uninspired and unimaginative. And who is going to pay the price? Us.

Wade Boese has more in a piece today in The American Prospect, in which he argues, it's complicated for the Bush administration to tell other countries that they are obliged to halt their programs when the Bush administration is pursuing development of new nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons:

The international goodwill the administration should have been able to derive from its nuclear-reduction plans has been offset not only by its rejection of some of the 13 steps but also by U.S. exploration of new and modified nuclear weapons, such as so-called bunker busters to destroy targets deep underground. Coupled with this research have been initiatives to revamp the U.S. nuclear complex so it is more capable of preserving existing weapons and, if necessary, producing and testing new ones...

What many other countries want, however, is for the United States to do a better job of meeting its own obligations. Measures that the administration could compromise on without diminishing U.S. security include abandoning research into new and modified nuclear warheads, reporting regularly on its nuclear holdings, destroying excess nuclear warheads instead of storing them, reversing its opposition to the treaty banning nuclear testing, and reassuring NPT states-parties without nuclear weapons that the United States would never use its nuclear stockpile against them. Progress on even one or two of these items would have a positive impact on the conference.

Without making any of these accommodations, though, the administration will have a hard time building consensus on stricter conditions under which countries can use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes and withdraw from the NPT.

Very hard problems made harder by an administration that is unwilling to be seen to be managing them.

Posted by Laura at May 2, 2005 11:44 AM