"The State Department and Pentagon have begun making plans for how to provide protection, transport, and logistical support to a possible peacekeeping mission in western Sudan," the New York Sun reports:

A senior State Department official told the Sun over the weekend that a larger peacekeeping operation could be assembled for Darfur and ready for deployment by the end of August, coinciding with the deadline for Sudan's compliance with the U.N. resolution. Part of the work now for American diplomats and military planners will be to draw up options for how large a force will be needed to deliver most of the aid the international community is prepared to send to refugees in Darfur and end the Janjaweed's campaign of terror against the refugees already forced to leave their homes. To date, the U.S. Agency for International Development has estimated that 20% of American aid is reaching its target.

Two important points. First, there's a big difference between a peacekeeping operation to help assist the delivery of humanitarian aid, and one to "end the Janjaweed's campaign of terror against the refugees." The right definition of the underlying real cause of the crisis, and the right mandate, force size, and firepower for peacekeepers to be effective and protect themselves and the vulnerable are essential. Bosnia and Somalia offer case studies for where there was a failure to do this. Despite being in the midst of a brutal war, UN peacekepers in Bosnia were only initially mandated to help protect delivery of humanitarian aid, and the result was them becoming ineffectual witnesses refusing to intervene to protect tens of thousands of people killed in horrible atrocities before their eyes. The US mission to Somalia was initially supposed to only provide assistance for the delivery of food aid; gradually US forces decided the famine was really the result of a turf war between warlords, not a real shortage of food. The proper definition of the real problem is essential from the get-go. Any mission that failed to forcefully ensure the Janjaweed are really disarmed would probably be too little.

Secondly, this contingency planning is better than nothing, but is less than it may sound. There are contingency plans for lots of contingencies that are not acted on. It doesn't mean that there is any will to really intervene. In addition, it is important to note that essentially, contingency plans are being prepared for the possibility that the US military could be involved only in the lift and logistics for an international peacekeeping mission to Darfur. Essentially we'd only be the airline.

All that said, it is encouraging that some sort of international force may be being prepared to go in sooner than later, since one thing the people of Darfur do not have is time.

Posted by Laura at August 2, 2004 07:22 AM