Other Sources. Or, the tale of the Algerian businessman, the Somali businessman, the West African businessman, and the [redacted] businessman, and those stubborn forged Niger uranium documents.

For the moment, let's set aside discussion of the relative merits - or not - of the claims regarding whether Iraq did or did not in fact seek uranium in Niger and in DR Congo in the 1999-2000 time period, to ask a different question. [After all, neither the SSCI report nor the Butler report ever establish that Iraq did in fact seek uranium from Africa since 1998. They say, the claims were not in their opinion disproven [e.g. absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But it's not evidence of a positive, either...] Further, it's important to point out, neither report even begins to contend that Iraq actually succeeded in acquiring any uranium . . .]

As I said, let's set that discussion aside for the moment to ask something different. That is: what specifically were the other alleged sources for the claim Iraq sought to discuss acquiring uranium in Niger, other than the reports Britain and the US received from Sismi that were discredited upon the discovery that Sismi's report was based on the counterfeit Niger uranium documents?

As I have previously noted, the Butler report asserts that the UK had "multiple" sources for the claim, while obscuring what those sources actually were. The IAEA, for one, has asked Britain to clarify the other sources it claims to have, which it has yet to do.

So what do we know about the nature of the reputed other sources? The most specific references to be found come from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report. Here are all the references to reputed other sources from the Senate report I could find:

* Several analysts interviewed by Committee staff also pointed out that information in the second intelligence report matched [redacted] reporting from 1999 which showed that an Algerian businessman, Baraka, was arranging a trip for the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawi, to visit Niger and other African countries in early February 1999. [Redacted]. [Cited from page 38 of the Senate report]

[ . . . ]

* The intelligence report indicated that former Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki was unaware of any contracts that had been signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of yellowcake while he was Prime Minister (1997-1999) or Foreign Minister (1996-1997). Mayaki said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he would have been aware of it. Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999, [redacted] businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that Mayaki interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq." [page 43]

[ . . . ]

* ([Redacted]) On November 25, 2002, The Naval [redacted] issued a very brief report Alleged Storage of Uranium Destined for Iraq [redacted] that a large quantity of uranium from Niger was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin. The uranium was reportedly sold to Iraq by Niger's President. The report provided the name and telephone numbers for the individual, a West African businessman, who was responsible for coordinating the alleged uranium transaction and indicated that he was willing to provide information about the transaction. CIA's DO told Committee staff that the businessman has never been contacted and the DO has not made an effort to determine whether this individual had any useful information . . . The Defense Humint Service (DHS) and the Navy also told Committee staff that they did not try to contact the businessman . . . The DHS told Committee staff that because the DHS examined the warehouse on December 17, 2002 and saw only what appeared to be bales of cotton in the warehouse, they did not see a reason to contact the businessman. . .[Pages 59-60]

[ . . . ]

* On March 8, 2003, the DIA provided an info memo (TS-99-177-03) to the Secretary of Defense in response to a March 8, 2003 Washington Post article, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake." The memo said, "we believe the IAEA is dismissing attempted Iraqi yellowcake purchases, largely based upon a single set of unverified documents concerning a contract between Niger and Iraq for the supply of 'pure uranium.' The [memo added that the] USG had not shared other [information] with the IAEA that suggested a Nigerien uranium deal with Iraq." The other intelligence referenced in the memo is the CIA intelligence report on the former ambassador's trip, which described the Nigerien Prime Minister's belief that an Iraqi delegation was interested in uranium, the Navy report from November 2002 which said uranium destined for Iraq was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin, and a fax from late 2001 found in the possession of a Somali businessman which described arrangements for shipping unidentified commodities in an amount that appeared similar to the amount in the Iraq-Niger yellowcake deal. The fax, however, did not mention uranium, Iraq, or Niger. [pages 69-70]

[ . . . ]

* On April 5, 2003, the [National Intellience Council] NIC issued a Sense of the Community Memorandum (SOCM), Niger: No Recent Uranium Sales to Iraq, (NIC SOCM 2001-12.) The SOCM said, "we judge it highly unlikely that Niamey has sold uranium yellowcake to Baghdad in recent years. The IC agrees with the IAEA assessment that key documents purported showing a recent Iraq-Niger sales accord are a fabrication. We judge that other reports from 2002 - one alleging warehousing of yellowcake for shipment to Iraq, a second alleging a 1999 visit by an Iraqi delegation to Niamey - do not constitute credible evidence of a recent or impending sale." . . .

(•) On June 12, 2003, the DIA sent an information memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in response to questions about Iraq's nuclear program. The memo said, "while the Intelligence Committee agrees that documents the IAEA reviewed were likely 'fake,' other unconfirmed reporting suggested that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium and yellowcake from African nations after 1998." The other reporting mentioned was the Navy report from November 2002, which said uranium destined for Iraq was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin.[pages 70-71]

So, let's review. The universe of other sources, at first glance, appears to include:

1) An Algerian businessman, Baraka.

According to the Senate report, Baraka was reported to be involved in arranging the trip for the then-Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawi, to Niger and three other African countries in early February 1999.

Where did this report of Baraka come from? The Senate report says Baraka was mentioned in the CIA Directorate of Operation's "second report" on the Niger uranium subject, issued on February 5, 2002. From the Senate report, p. 37:

Reporting on the uranium transaction did not surface again until February 5, 2002 when the CIA's DO issued a second intelligence report [redacted] which again cited the source as a "[foreign] government service." Although not identified in the report, this source was also from the foreign service. The second report provided more details about the previously reported Iraq-Niger uranium agreement and provided what was said to be "verbatim text" of the accord.

From what I know from other reporting, the foreign government source for this second intelligence report was not Britain, but Italy's Sismi. The timing is right around the time a high ranking Sismi official briefed a high ranking CIA official in Washington in February 2002 on the Niger uranium claims.

And as you can see from the section excerpted above, the obvious source for the "verbatim text" the "foreign service" gave to the CIA in February 2002 was lifted from the documents which we now know to have been the counterfeit Niger uranium documents. In any case, Baraka is not described so much as an independent source on the deal, but as someone described by the foreign government service to the CIA as part of the deal. Nevertheless, the larger context for the Baraka claim to the CIA appears to be the counterfeit Niger uranium docs.

More alleged sources for the claim:

2) A "[redacted] businessman."

The Niger prime minister and former foreign minister Mayaki said..."that in June 1999, [redacted] businessman approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss 'expanding commercial relations' between Niger and Iraq...The intelligence report also said that 'although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq.'"

Who is this businessman? The timing alluded to here suggests he is not the Algerian businessman, because the Algerian businessman referred to above was reportedly trying to broker the meeting between the Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican and the Niger authorities back in February 1999, not in June 1999.

I'll reserve a hypothesis for now until I can get more information. But one thing to note is this is a pretty uncompelling allegation. The Niger prime minister is saying that the redacted businessman was trying to set up a meeting which he admits occurred, but says that he didn't allow uranium to be discussed.

3) The West African businessman.

"...The Naval [redacted] issued a very brief report Alleged Storage of Uranium Destined for Iraq [redacted] that a large quantity of uranium from Niger was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin. The uranium was reportedly sold to Iraq by Niger's President. The report provided the name and telephone numbers for the individual, a West African businessman, who was responsible for coordinating the alleged uranium transaction.

This would seem to be the strongest example of a genuine potential "other source" to be found in the report on the Niger uranium issue, to my mind. And yet, no one ever interviewed him, so he clearly is not much of an independent source. And when the USG did check out the warehouse supposedly involved, it didn't find any yellowcake.

Here is mention of someone who is alleged in a Navy report to actually be involved in the coordination of a deal. It's also worth noting that this section on the Navy report is different from citations of "other sources" in the Senate report because it does not appear to be originally sourced from a foreign government at all. At least the Senate report doesn't indicate the Navy got this from a foreign government service (or where the Navy got this information at all).

In any case, a month after the Navy report is issued in November 2002 mentioning the West African businessman, US sources did get check out the Cotonou, Benin warehouse alleged in the Navy report to be the transit point for yellowcake, and it turns out to hold bales of cotton. Subsequently, according to the Senate report, there's no US government effort to follow up and interview the businessman.

I basically agree with the SSCI report admonition that the US government should have at least tried to interview this West African businessman - which none of the three US intel agencies, including the Defense HUMINT agency, did. If his identity can be ascertained, some journalist should try to go interview him.

But it's hard to see how the West African businessman ultimately amounts to a real other source for the Niger uranium claims, by virtue of the fact, no one ever interviewed him. If someone leaves a journalist a voice mail with his name and phone number and says on the message, I know about X, Y, Z, one simply can't include him in one's article as a source, without interviewing him. What's more, if the journalist checks out what the person said he's involved in, and it appears to be false, it wouldn't be enough to base a story on. So even this West African businessman, the potentially strongest inkling of another source from the SSCI report, seems to be deeply problematic at best.

4) A fax from late 2001 found in the possession of a Somali businessman, "that appeared similar to the amount in the Iraq-Niger yellowcake deal. The fax, however, did not mention uranium, Iraq, or Niger."

It's hard to know what to make of this, the mention is so cryptic, and seems to evaporate from further reporting. How the fax alluded to was obtained, and how the Somali businessman upon which it was found came to the US's attention, remain steeped in mystery. This would seem to likely be a potential British other source, but until Britain makes clear what or who it provided, it's hard to know.

I will point out that among the forged Niger uranium documents is a fax reporting that quantities of something chemical being transported from Niamey to Cotonou Benin from August 2001. Check out this one.

However, this does not appear to be the fax in question, because it is a fax from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the fax mentioned in the SSCI report is described as having no mention of Niger, Iraq, or uranium.

In any case, the research so far suggests the fax found on the Somali businessman is the closest hint we have to what Britain's other source may be. Secondly, some news reports have suggested Britain's "other source" had been obtained by signals intelligence, and a fax would potentially seem of that nature.

So, where are we?

It seems to me the only potential "other sources" left standing are the Somali businessman and potentially the West African businessman, who the US never interviewed. That said, there is evidence pointing against the fact that the transaction with which the West African businessman was alleged to have been involved actually transpired. There was no yellowcake found in the Cotonou warehouse, and -- oh yeah -- there was no new uranium found in Iraq.

It seems the Somali businessman is the strongest contender for a "British other source." But then again, he is the source ultimately of a fax that mentions no Niger, no Iraq, and no uranium. It's not quite the kind of evidence one would want to take a country to war on.

I'm obviously not an intelligence expert. But it seems to me the CIA's judgment, described below from the Senate report, makes sense:

(U) On June 17, 2003, nearly five months after the President delivered the State of the Union address, the CIA produced a memorandum for the DCI which said, "since learning that the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring, we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad."

When you compare the other sources described in the Senate report with the forged documents themselves, and the fact that no WMD have been found in Iraq (a crucial point), they seem largely to evaporate, and appear rather to be elements of a fictional transaction recorded in what all investigators have agreed are counterfeit documents.

But we won't know for sure unless and until Britain clarifies what its independent sources for the uranium from Africa claims were. Why it doesn't begs the question, what does it have to hide? Is it ashamed its claimed "other sources" aren't more credible, or is there some other explanation?

Posted by Laura at July 18, 2004 02:07 PM